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The Trademark Dilution Revision Act—
A Consumer Perspective
Paul Alan Levy∗
The proposed Trademark Dilution Revision Act 1 should be
considered from a litigation perspective, not only a theoretical
analysis of how dilution law ought to be configured. The
following analysis of the bill is based on the realities of trademark
litigation as seen from the trenches while representing and advising
individuals or small businesses that have been sued, or threatened
with suit, for using trademarks, not for the purpose of selling
competing goods, but to enhance their expression by invoking
trademarks.
An early case brought against Public Citizen2 provides a useful
point of reference. In 1982, Public Citizen’s Health Research
Group published a book about the dangers posed by a class of
tranquilizers, the benzodiazepines, that it felt were being widely
over-prescribed and abused. 3 Valium was by far the most widely
known and the best advertised example of that class of drugs. 4 The
authors chose the title “Stopping Valium” because that was the
most pithy way to catch public attention and tell people what the
book was about. For simplicity’s sake, the text referred generally
to “Valium” as denoting the entire class of drugs, but used the term

∗ B.A, Reed College; J.D. University of Chicago. As attorneys at Public Citizen
Litigation Group, Mr. Levy and his colleagues represented the accused infringers and
diluters, or advised other attorneys who were representing the accused, in a number of the
cases cited in this article.
1
H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2005).
2
Public Citizen is a national non-profit public interest organization. More information
is available at http://www.citizen.org.
3
EVE BARGMAN, ET AL., STOPPING VALIUM AND ATIVAN, CENTRAX, DALMANE,
LIBRIUM, PAXIPAM, RESTORIL, SERAX, TRANXENE, XANAX (Warner Books 1983).
4
Ron Lacey, Mother’s Little Helper, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Feb. 1984, available at
http://www.newint.org/issue132/helper.htm (last visited May 5, 2006).
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“Valium®” when referring to the specific brand-named drug. 5 A
disclaimer on the first page of the book explained the difference,
and the full title included, in smaller print, the other brand names
of the drugs in the benzodiazepine family.
Hoffman LaRoche, which made Valium, wanted to suppress
the book. Apparently, it could not find anything untruthful about
the product, which might have supported a claim for libel or
product disparagement. Instead, it filed a trademark claim. The
theory was that it was unfair to characterize the whole class of
drugs by using the single term “Valium.” So it asked for damages
and injunctive relief, including the recall of the 30,000 books that
Public Citizen had managed to send into the marketplace so that
they, along with all remaining stocks of the book, could be
destroyed. 6
Public Citizen is a substantial institution. 7 It can defend itself,
using its in-house litigation capability, and it did defend itself in
this instance. It called a press conference to denounce HoffmanLaRoche’s planned book-burning, which attracted attention to
Public Citizen’s criticisms and to the company’s bizarre claim.
Hoffman-LaRoche also had bad luck in drawing a judge who was
offended by its invocation of the standard emergency relief of the
sort normally deployed against transient sellers of pirated handbags
and watches—its request for recall all these books so that they
could be destroyed. Hoffman-LaRoche’s motion for a temporary
restraining order against publication of the book was denied.

5

See BARGMAN, supra note 3.
Details of the litigation are based on the author’s personal recollections as well as
discussion with the two Litigation Group lawyers who handled the case, John Cary Sims,
who now teaches at McGeorge School of Law, and David C. Vladeck, who now teaches
at Georgetown Law Center, and with Joan Levin, a Health Group employee who was one
of the book’s authors. The case file was not available.
7
Public Citizen, Inc., a § 501(c)(4) consumer advocacy organization, together with the
associated Public Citizen Foundation, a § 501(c)(3) organization, had more than
$12 million in expenditures in 2005 according to the tax returns and annual report that
appear at http://www.citizen.org/about/index.cfm?ID=5165 (last visited Aug. 4, 2006).
The history of the Litigation Group is recounted in Craig, Courting Change: The Story of
the Public Citizen Litigation Group. See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_Citizen
(last visited Aug. 4, 2006); http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_Citizen_Litigation_Group
(last visited Aug. 4, 2006).
6
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But the trademark specialists with whom Public Citizen’s inhouse counsel were consulting warned that they could not
guarantee that Public Citizen would win on a motion to dismiss.
Consequently, Public Citizen had to worry about the costs of
discovery, which can be both expensive and time consuming. To
settle the case, the organization agreed that future versions of the
book would not refer to Valium alone, but would, instead, use the
phrase “Valium and its chemical cousins,” and that the disclaimer
would be more detailed. Such a face-saving settlement let
plaintiff’s counsel get something for their client while letting
Public Citizen out of the case. 8
This result was, of course, a victory for Public Citizen; the
settlement almost makes Hoffman-LaRoche look ridiculous. But
the more important point is that even a substantial organization
with an office full of experienced litigators had to find a way out of
the case by doing something to make the bully go away. Most
people who receive threats of litigation like this cannot defend
themselves. If they receive a threat of a suit, or even more
alarming, notice of an actual suit and a motion for a preliminary
injunction—such as the two boxes of documents that Carla Virga
received in Yuba City, California, warning her that she would have
to come to Memphis to defend a preliminary injunction hearing
over her use of the names “ServiceMaster” and “Terminix” in the
meta tags for a web site attacking those companies 9 —they submit
quickly.
Trademark lawyers have become notorious for
threatening litigation over the most questionable claims. Yet,
threats of litigation, not to speak of receipt of an actual complaint,
are highly intimidating because most individuals know nothing
about trademark law and have no contact with experienced
trademark counsel. And, if they consult a local lawyer, they are
8

The cover pages and first pages with disclaimers from the original, self-published
edition, and the mass-market paper back edition published after the litigation, can be
viewed on Public Citizen’s web site, http://www.citizen.org/litigation/briefs/
HealthSafety/articles.cfm?ID=15035 (last visited May 5, 2006).
9
Rick Lockridge, Consumers Fight Corporations on Web, But Protests Costly,
CNN.COM, Mar. 17, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/03/17/
online.protests/index.html (last visited May 5, 2005). An archive of information about
the suit can be found on Ms. Virga’s personal web site at http://www.syix.com/
emu/html/svmvv.html.
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likely to learn how expensive and complicated the defense of
trademark litigation can be. In drafting changes to the trademark
laws, Congress needs to take these practical concerns into
consideration.
I. GENERAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE BILL
A reasonable consumer advocate naturally supports the
trademark laws in principle. 10 Customers often care about the
source of products or services that they are considering, and the
expectations created by a mark that has secondary meaning should
be respected and protected against abuse. Trademarks play a vital
role in helping consumers distinguish between the goods and
services that come from businesses on which they have learned to
rely to supply what they want in the marketplace, from impostors
who are trying to trade on some other company’s hard-earned
reputation. 11 Moreover, even though commercial speech enjoys
substantial protection under the First Amendment, 12 a successful
cause of action against a commercial competitor for trademark
infringement rests on a finding that the defendant’s use was likely
to cause consumer confusion, thus fitting squarely within wellaccepted standards for regulating commercial speech to bar “false
or misleading” statements. 13
Dilution law is far less defensible, because it extends protection
to trademarks as an asset apart from their sole function of
10

Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age,
108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999); Ralph S. Brown Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest:
Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 108 YALE L.J. 1619 (1999) (reprinting article
originally published at 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948)).
11
Anti-Monopoly v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 301 (9th Cir. 1979) (“All
of [the] legitimate trademark purposes derive ultimately from the mark’s representation
of a single fact: the product’s source. It is the source denoting function which trademark
laws protect, and nothing more”); Smith v. Chanel, 402 F.2d 562, 566–69 (9th Cir. 1968)
(explaining how confining trademark law to this function best serves consumers’ and
companies’ interests). See also West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d
581, 590 (6th Cir. 1955).
12
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
13
FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
citing In re RMJ, 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); see also Castrol v. Pennzoil, 987 F.2d 939,
949 (3d Cir. 1993).
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protecting consumers against confusion, and which, indeed, is used
to suppress completely truthful and non-confusing commercial
speech by other merchants. Thus, wholly apart from the
substantial debate in the literature about whether the expansion of
trademark law beyond mere prevention of confusion about source
is improperly anti-competitive, 14 dilution law’s limits on truthful
commercial speech raise serious questions of public policy as well
as constitutionality. 15 Over the years, Public Citizen attorneys
have defended both the right of businesses to engage in truthful
commercial speech, 16 and the right of state and federal
governments to regulate commercial speech to ensure that it is not
misleading. 17 Indeed, it was Public Citizen lawyers who brought
the case that established the modern doctrine of commercial
speech, because they recognized that protecting the rights of
businesses to talk about their wares—and their prices—encourages
competition and hence serves consumers’ interest in obtaining
better products at lower prices.18
The current bill could, then, have been the occasion to ask
whether the entire dilution enterprise has been more trouble than it
is worth, as Professors Farley and Beebe do. 19 Along with other
trademark scholars, 20 they have raised a variety of interesting
14

E.g., Glynn S. Lunney Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999).
In Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 905–06 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002), Judge
Kozinski raised, but did not answer, the issue of whether a dilution injunction in the
commercial speech context might violate the First Amendment.
16
E.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (right of accountant to advertise
services); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626 (1985) (attorney right to advertise using illustration of intra-uterine device).
17
E.g., Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
18
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Cf. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (a Public Citizen case which
established that the practice of law was subject to the antitrust law, and hence Bar
schedules for lawyers’ fees constituted price-fixing).
19
See Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV.
2020, 2027 (2005). Christine Haight Farley, Why We Are Confused About the Trademark
Dilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1175 (2006).
20
E.g., Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling away of the Rational
Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 795 (1997); Malla Pollack,
Time To Dilute the Dilution Statute and What Not To Do When Opposing Legislation, 78
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 519 (1996); Kenneth L. Port, The “Unnatural”
Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 447–49 (1994). See also David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution
15
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issues about dilution. 21 These concerns are of a piece with the
larger points that dilution can be such a fuzzy concept that overenforcement is likely, 22 and that the undue expansion of
intellectual property rights can impose a severe cost on the public
domain that needlessly limits expression and innovation. 23
Regrettably, however, the various scholars who entertain
private doubts about the enterprise, and publish their doubts in the
law reviews, never stepped forward to raise those doubts in
Congress, allowing the “luminaries of the trademark bar” to
present the impression that the profession was unified in support
for dilution law. 24 Moreover, Congress decided in 1996 to include
some protections against dilution in the Lanham Act, 25 and Public
Citizen has opted not to ask Congress to revisit that decision.
Still, to the extent that some trademark interests want to amend
the 1996 statute, the burden is on them to make the case that the
changes are needed. The main objection to HR 683, the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act, is that it has serious anti-speech
implications for consumers. 26 Along with other members of its
coalition to fix the bill, 27 Public Citizen confined its advocacy
Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American
Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117 (2004) (arguing that dilution statute should be
replaced by rules protecting truly famous and distinctive marks against free riding).
21
Id.
22
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL LEGISLATION COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL DILUTION STATUTE 4–7
(April 11, 2005), available at http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/nyc1-560488-6.pdf (last
visited July 23, 2006) [hereinafter ABCNY REPORT].
23
See generally James Boyle, The Public Domain: Foreword: The Opposite of
Property?, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2003). See also WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 23–24
(AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies 2004) (“Skeptics of government
should hesitate to extend a presumption of efficiency to a process by which government
grants rights to exclude competition with the holders of the rights.”).
24
Testimony in favor of dilution reform was presented by representatives of the
American Intellectual Property Law Association (“AIPLA”), International Trademark
Association (“INTA”), and the Intellectual Property Section of the American Bar
Association.
25
Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051–1072, 1091–1096, 1111–1127, 1141,
1141(a)–(n) (2005).
26
H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2005).
27
Public Citizen has been joined by groups ranging from frequent critics of expansive
intellectual property legislation, such as Public Knowledge and the Electronic Frontier
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efforts on Capitol Hill to those issues, even if some of the other
changes seem to be unjustified.
First, the proposal to amend the definition of famousness to
resolve the split in the circuits about whether dilution claims can
be brought over marks that are well-known only in niche
markets, 28 by requiring that the marks be “widely recognized by
the general consuming public of the United States,” 29 seems to be
a worthwhile one. Given the significant power that dilution gives
to suppress truthful commercial speech, it is just as well that the
range of marks that are given such protection be as narrow as
possible. Professor Beebe, in his remarks at the symposium,
objected to the creation of a category of supermarks that are given
superpowers, arguing instead that a general principle against free
riding ought to be extended to all marks or given to none. 30
Perhaps as a strategy for arguing against dilution law in general
this approach has merit, but in the absence of any serious effort to
repeal the dilution cause of action, it seems better to limit the range
of marks that enjoy the illegitimate protection that dilution law
affords.
Similarly, the American Civil Liberties Union objected even to
overruling the Supreme Court’s decision in Moseley v. V Secret
Foundation, and organizations concerned with the civil liberties implications of the
legislation, such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Library
Association, to organizations of artists and writers who worried primarily about the
pragmatic impact of the elimination of the non-commercial use defense and the limitation
of the scope of the fair use defense on their ability to use trademarks as reference points
or in the incidental background of their works, such as the Society of Children’s Book
Writers and Illustrators, the Authors Guild, Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, Professional
Photographers of America, Advertising Photographers of America, and American Society
of Media Photographers. The abundance of photographers’ organizations in the coalition
was a specific result of the symposium that spawned this issue of the Law Journal,
because Edward Greenberg, a New York lawyer who represents creative small business
people, attended the symposium, took note of the implications of the legislation for his
creative clients, and helped spread the word in the arts community about the dangerous
implications of the parts of the legislation on which Public Citizen has concentrated.
28
Compare Advantage Rent-a-Car v. Enterprise Rent-a-Car, 238 F.3d 378, 381 (5th
Cir. 2001) (allowing niche market claims) with TCPIP Holding Co. v. Harr Commc’ns.,
244 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir. 2001) (refusing to allow niche market claims).
29
H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 43(c)(2)(A) (2005).
30
Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 16
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143 (2006).
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Catalogue, 31 on the ground that any change that makes it easier to
enforce dilution law necessarily threatens protected speech. 32
Tempting though it may be to hamper the enforcement of a bad
provision of the law by creating a very high burden of proof for
liability, if one accepts the basic decision to protect against
dilution, then at least one of the policy objections to Moseley on
the issue that it decided—that as written the dilution law bars only
“actual dilution” of a famous mark—is sound. 33 Insofar as the
standard of “actual dilution” threatens to bar a claim until the mark
has already become diluted, that limitation seems inappropriate for
a statute whose focus is on injunctive relief rather than damages. 34
As the proponents argue, if actual dilution is the prerequisite for
relief, the owner of a famous mark cannot obtain forward-looking
relief until the injury that the statute is intended to prevent has not
only been suffered, but has been suffered long enough for the
lawsuit to be filed, litigated, and resolved. 35 The amendment of
section 43(c)(1) to authorize injunctive relief when the owner of
the famous mark has shown that dilution is “likely” seems sound. 36
The other main argument for the “likely dilution” standard,
however—that it has been too hard to enforce the dilution
subsection under the “actual dilution” standard 37 —is less than
compelling. Because dilution law bars truthful speech, the cause
of action should be hard to prove. 38 Indeed, the data suggest that
31

Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
American Civil Liberties Union Testimony at a Hearing on H.R. 638, “The
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005,” February 17, 2005, at 4–7, available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/johnson021705.pdf. (last visited Apr. 11, 2005)
[hereinafter ACLU Testimony].
33
Moseley, 537 U.S. at 1125.
34
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
35
Testimony of Anne Gundelfinger, President, International Trademark Association,
H.R. 683, Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, Feb. 17, 2005, at 3, 9, available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/gundelfinger021705.pdf.) (last visited Apr. 11,
2005).
36
Id. at 15.
37
Statement of William G. Barber on Behalf of the American Intellectual Property Law
Association on the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005 (H.R. 683), Feb. 17, 2005, at
3, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/barber021705.pdf. (last visited Apr.
11, 2005).
38
J. Thomas McCarthy, Symposium: Trademark in Transition: Institute For
Intellectual Property & Information Law Symposium: Proving a Trademark Has Been
32
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even under state statutes, which as the Supreme Court noted
expressly extend to likely dilution,39 there were hardly any cases in
which the dilution cause of action made any difference in the
outcome. 40 Indeed, this history of practical inability to enforce the
rules against dilution, first under the state laws and for nearly ten
years under the FTDA, 41 might occasion wonder whether dilution
law might represent a solution in search of a problem.
One might also question whether there is a sound basis for
expressly covering “tarnishment,” 42 eliminating doubts raised by
Moseley about whether the language of the federal dilution statute
extends beyond “blurring” to cover tarnishment. 43 The theory of a
tarnishment cause of action is that the objectionable use creates
“negative” associations with a famous mark that has otherwise
enjoyed only positive ones—in the language of the proposed
statute, “association arising from the similarity between a mark or
trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the
famous mark.” 44
But tarnishment cases tend to involve
commentary on the trademark holder–sometimes nasty
commentary, but commentary nonetheless. 45 Thus, if litigated

Diluted: Theories or Facts?, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 713, 747 (2004) [hereinafter McCarthy,
Proving Dilution] (“The extraordinary remedy of an antidilution law should require
evidentiary rigor by the courts. . . It should be viewed as a unique legal tool to be used
only in an unusual case.”).
39
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 432 (2003).
40
McCarthy, Proving Dilution, supra note 38, at 715; ABCNY REPORT, supra note 22,
at 11 (citing Trademark Review Commission of the United States Trademark Association
(Trademark Review Commission), Report and Recommendations to USTA President and
Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 454–55 (1988)).
41
Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1051 (1995).
42
H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 43(c)(1) (2005); ACLU Testimony, supra note 32, at 6–7
(expressing particular alarm over the extension of dilution law to bar tarnishment).
43
“Whether it is actually embraced by the statutory text, however, is another matter.
Indeed, the contrast between the state statutes, which expressly refer to both ‘injury to
business reputation’ and to ‘dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade name or
trademark,’ and the federal statute which refers only to the latter, arguably supports a
narrower reading of the FTDA.” Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432.
44
H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 43(c)(2)(C) (2005).
45
Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994) (commercial by maker of
the “Yard-Man,” a competitor of John Deere ride-on lawnmower, diluted the Deere
product by portraying it as a frightened deer being chased around the yard by defendant’s
product); Anheuser Busch v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994) (satirical
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under the proposed amendment, the defendants would likely
prevail by arguing that even if their uses were otherwise tarnishing,
the tarnishment resulted from their explicit or implicit commentary
on the trademark holder. 46 Other examples that proponents of the
change have cited in their arguments for reform—such as the use
of a famous mark in a domain name to direct Internet users to a
pornographic web site—would seem to be examples of blurring as
well as tarnishment. 47
Indeed, at the symposium, the two speakers who represented
INTA 48 and the AIPLA 49 were challenged to identify even a single
“Michelob Oily” advertisement diluted beer brand by implying that it was contaminated
by oil).
46
In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979),
for example, the film-maker would argue that the film was commenting on the intended
associations created by football cheerleaders by taking their provocative on-field
behavior and costumes to an imagined extreme. In Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co.,
287 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2003), the film-maker would argue that by portraying
Caterpillar tractors being used to tear down the good guys’ dwellings, it was simply
pointing out that tractors can be used for bad destruction as well as good destruction. The
“Yard-Man” commercial litigated in the Deere case is an obvious example of
comparative advertising, which enjoys its own separate exemption from dilution claims.
Deere, 41 F.3d 39.
47
Amend the Fed. Trademark Dilution Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts., the
Internet, and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess. 44–
45 (Comm. Print Apr. 22, 2004) (Testimony of David Stimson, chief trademark counsel
for Eastman Kodak), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/
hju93227.000/hju93227_0.HTM. Similarly, the only case specifically identified by
INTA President Anne Gundelfinger as showing the need for a tarnishment cause of
action, Coca-Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo USA, 719 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. Ill. 1989), cited at page
12 and n.41, involved a candy maker who sold a powdered candy called “Magic Powder”
in packages that imitated the famous shape of the classic Coca-Cola bottle. Although
Coca-Cola argued there that the bottle created an unwanted association with cocaine,
under the proposed amendments it could just as easily have argued that defendant’s
product posed a likelihood of blurring by diminishing the uniqueness of the association of
the shape with its well-known soft-drink.
48
The International Trademark Association is a not-for-profit membership association
that works to advance the interests of trademark owners. International Trademark
Association, About INTA, http://www.inta.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=
view&id=14&Itemid=37&getcontent=4 (last visited July 8, 2006).
49
The American Intellectual Property Law Association is a national bar association that
represents individuals, companies and institutions in the areas of patent, trademark,
copyright, unfair competition law, and other fields of law related to intellectual property.
American Intellectual Property Law Association, The History of AIPLA,
http://www.aipla.org/Content/NavigationMenu/About_AIPLA/History/History.htm (last
visited July 8, 2006).
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case in which a trademark owner would be likely to prevail on a
claim of tarnishment, notwithstanding the fair use defense, but
would not be likely to prevail on a blurring claim. 50 They were
unable to do so. AIPLA President Barber cited a case, which he
had mentioned in his Congressional testimony, brought by CocaCola against the maker of a poster that showed the words “Enjoy
Cocaine” in a script mimicking Coca-Cola’s logo. 51 But if that
case were litigated under the proposed TDRA, the defendant would
surely point out that “Enjoy Cocaine” comments on Coke in at
least two ways. First, the poster points to the hypocrisy of
promoting a drink because of the “jolt” that its caffeine provides,
while making cocaine illegal; second, it reminds viewers of the
fact that Coca-Cola derived its name from the facts that extract of
coca leaves was one of its active ingredients, and that early
versions of the product contained trace amounts of cocaine. 52
Although the Coca-Cola Company no doubt would prefer to ignore
this history, winning a lawsuit against such commentary would not
be possible if the “fair use” exception for commentary on the
trademark holder is to be enforced. 53 The proponents of the bill
did not try to offer any further examples. 54

50

This author issued this challenge in his opening remarks, and when they did not rise
to the occasion, noted the omission. Sonia Katyal et al., Panel II: Trademark Dilution
Revision Act Implications, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1093 (2006)
[hereinafter Trademark Panel] (Paul Alan Levy, panelist). In response to this second
challenge, Mr. Barber offered the example discussed in the text. Id. (William Barber,
panelist).
51
Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Trademark
Panel, supra note 50 (William Barber, panelist).
52
Snopes.com, Cocaine-Cola, http://www.snopes.com/cokelore/cocaine.asp (last
visited July 22, 2006).
53
Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
54
A similar point could be made about the example of tarnishment offered by Professor
Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, citing New York Stock Exchange, Inc. v. New York,
New York Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d 550 (2d Cir. 2002), albeit not in response to my
challenge. In that case, the New York Stock Exchange objected to the naming of a
display within a casino as the “New York $lot Exchange” or “NY$E.” The very aspect
of the sobriquet that might be tarnishing, the sly allusion to stock trading as a form of
high-brow gambling in which the odds are stacked against the outsider to ensure that the
house always makes a profit, represents a parodic commentary on the trademark holder
that would be protected by the newly adopted fair use exception.
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But if there are not a significant number of cases in which a
tarnishment claim is needed because it could succeed when a
blurring claim could not, one may well ask whether the new
tarnishment language is not an invitation to generally fruitless
and/or unnecessary litigation. That is not to say that the statutory
language may not serve a purpose—if the owner of a famous mark
has a deep pocket, and wants to overwhelm an underfunded
opponent, maybe it is helpful to add causes of action to the
complaint. And a cease and desist letter, which mark holders
commonly send to intimidate prospective defendants into giving up
their rights without the need for litigation, can certainly be made to
sound more threatening if it can promise two claims instead of just
one. But enabling more threatening demands and complaints, for
claims that cannot otherwise succeed independently, is not a
legitimate purpose for enacting new causes of action.
Moreover, the reasons offered for allowing a cause of action
for “likely” dilution in the context of blurring do not apply with
equal force to claims of dilution by tarnishment. The modern trend
in the law of defamation is to require proof of actual damage to
reputation as an element of the cause of action, even when
defamation per se is at issue. 55 Similarly, a claim for trade libel or
commercial defamation cannot succeed without a showing of
special damages. 56 It is anomalous for the federal cause of action
for use of trademarks that cause injury to the mark’s reputation to
allow claims where the injury is only “likely” to occur, but has not
yet been suffered.
A related point goes to the issue of damages. If “likelihood of
dilution” is based on an injury that has not yet occurred, why
should the diluter be liable for an award of damages? Should not
damages be confined to cases in which actual dilution has been
established? And given the fact that the bill’s proponents are
confident that actual dilution is too high a standard because it
cannot be met, why should dilution give rise to any damages
claim? Is the prospect of damages awards just an invitation to

55

Walker v. Grand Cent. Sanitation, 634 A.2d. 237, 241–42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
KBT Corp. v. Ceridian Corp., 966 F. Supp. 369, 375 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Forum Publ’ns
v. P.T. Publishers, 700 F. Supp. 236, 243 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
56
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fruitless litigation? Or is its purpose to make it easier to send more
intimidating demand letters?
The Federal Legislation Committee of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York has raised several additional concerns
about the bill that seem justified. For example, its report objected
to the language in proposed section 43(c)(1) that would allow
dilution claims for marks that are “distinctive . . . through acquired
distinctiveness.” 57 The stated purpose of this change is to overrule
a line of Second Circuit authority that limits famousness to marks
whose distinctiveness is inherent. 58 When a company has
deliberately chosen a brand name whose original meaning is
derived from common English usage, it seems fair for the company
to bear the risk that others might use the same name in ways that
do not give rise to any likelihood of confusion. 59 But even worse,
in such circumstances the provision of a right of action beyond
cases of confusion has the result of depriving other businesses of
the right to employ words of common usage that ought to remain
in the public domain.
Why, for example, should the fact that American Airlines and
United Airlines are famous marks be sufficient to allow them to
discourage new companies in a completely different line of
business from using American or United in their names? Aren’t
those the kind of words that ought to be available to all to describe
their products? Or, to extrapolate from the recent example
provided by a dilution claim filed by Virgin Enterprises against
several small companies that used the term “Virgin” in their
business names, 60 why should the presumed famousness of Virgin
Enterprises’ mark be sufficient to afford a basis for suit against a
new company that made statues of the Virgin Mary and called
itself “Virgin Monuments”? 61 Of course, Virgin Enterprises didn’t
57

ABCNY REPORT, supra note 22, at 26–27, 36–38.
TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns, 244 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2001).
59
Franklyn, supra note 20, at 159–63.
60
Virgin Enters. v. So Collective, No. 04-08964 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 12, 2004);
see Branson Attempts to Rip “Virgin” From the Dictionary, CHILLING EFFECTS
CLEARINGHOUSE, July 10, 2005, http://www.chillingeffects.org/weather.cgi?Weather
ID=507.
61
See Amanda Cantrell, Branson trademark suit sparks debate: ‘Rebel billionaire’
sues small companies using word ‘Virgin’—and often wins. But is it right?,
58
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sue any defendants for using “Virgin” in connection with religious
materials. Bullies don’t pick on opponents who are likely to be
supported in litigation by well-funded entities like the Catholic
Church; they pick on defendants who are unlikely to be able to
defend themselves. But the law shouldn’t make it easier for them
to do so. 62
Although the proposed statute overrules the Second Circuit’s
distinction between acquired and inherent distinctiveness as a basis
for dilution claims, it incorporates that distinction as part of the
“factors” to be used in deciding whether the challenged use caused
“blurring.” 63 These factors would presumably enable the owner of
a new business that used a common word like “American” or
“Virgin” in its name to argue that it does not cause appreciable
blurring because so many others use similar terms in their names
and, indeed, in common usage. But that possibility is fairly small
comfort to an individual or small business that is threatened with a
dilution claim. Trademark claims are notoriously expensive to
litigate. 64 Although multi-factor tests often have the advantage of
allowing courts to be flexible and to tailor their decisions to
particular facts, they have the disadvantages of increasing the
scope of allowable discovery and substantially increasing the
expense of the litigation. A new or small business simply cannot
afford to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees to
litigate the “dilution by blurring” factors in order to establish its
CNNMONEY.COM, June 29, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/29/news/newsmakers/
branson_suit/index.htm.
62
Although the use of the term “Virgin” to describe the mother of Christ long precedes
the famousness of Virgin Enterprises, that would not afford a defense to a new company
under the rule that a dilution claim may be brought only against “a person who, at any
time after the owner’s mark has become famous, commences use of” the allegedly
diluting mark. § 43(c)(1). The Church itself could continue to use the term “Virgin” to
describe its products, but a company founded today could not.
63
These factors include “the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the
famous mark,” Lanham Act § 43(c)(2)(B)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(ii) (2000), and
“the extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive
use of the mark,” Lanham Act § 43(c)(2)(B)(iii), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(iii) (2000).
64
Ethan Horwitz, Cost of Action vs. Damages in Trademark Infringement Actions in
the United States, FICPI 5TH OPEN FORUM, Nov. 1999, http://www.ficpi.org/library/
montecarlo99/damages.html (last visited July 22, 2006) (noting that an AIPLA study
shows that a typical trademark infringement case costs $150,000 through discovery and
$300,000 through trial).
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right to sell “American” brand widgets. Moreover, the distinction
between inherent and acquired distinctiveness is not given any role
in determining claims of dilution by tarnishment. Thus, the
mention of “inherent distinctiveness” among the blurring factors is
not an adequate replacement for the Second Circuit rule limiting
famousness to inherently distinctive marks. 65
II. SPEECH-RELATED CONCERNS RAISED BY THE BILL
Still, these questions have not been Public Citizen’s main
concerns. Instead, its advocacy about the bill has focused on two
changes made in the bill’s revisions to the “exclusions” section,
which are paragraph (4) of the existing statute, and are now
paragraph (3) of the bill. Section 43(c)(1) of the Act limits the
cause of action for dilution to “commercial use in commerce,” and
the exclusions provision of section 43, section 43(c)(4)(B), gives
express protection to “non-commercial” uses of trademarks. 66 In
H.R. 683, however, the limiting words “commercial use in
commerce” were eliminated from section 43(c)(1). Moreover,
although as originally introduced in the House the bill still
contained the defense of “non-commercial use” in section 43(c)(3)
(the new exclusions paragraph), that exception was eliminated in
the course of House Committee hearings, and replaced by a second
“fair use” provision allowing “fair use . . . including for purposes
of identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the
famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark
owner.” 67 Second, as introduced in the House, the bill would
replace the coverage of the exclusions section, which under section
43(c)(4) stated, “the following shall not be actionable under this
section,” to read instead that “the following shall not be actionable
as dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this

65

TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns, 244 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2001).
Lanham Act § 43(c)(4)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B) (2000).
67
Trademark Dilution Act of 2005: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts., the Internet,
and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005). H.R. 683,
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.
128&filename=98924.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/109_house_hearings [hereinafter
Trademark Dilution Act Hearing].
66

LEVY_ARTICLE_091606_CLEAN

1204

9/17/2006 6:02:43 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 16:1189

subsection.” 68 Both provisions raised our concerns because of
their potential impact on protected speech. These concerns are
both theoretical and practical.
The changes are problematic in part because they increase the
likelihood that trademark claims will be threatened or pursued
against constitutionally protected speech implicating concerns
under the First Amendment. The First Amendment applies, of
course, because, even though trademark litigation is pursued
between private parties, a court is a government actor, and hence a
damages award based on speech, like an injunction against speech,
must be consistent with the First Amendment. 69 Moreover, the
First Amendment limits Congress’ power to enact a “law”
restricting speech. 70 Accordingly, to the extent that the domain of
trademark law is extended beyond the use of marks to identify the
source of competing commercial products, the First Amendment
has the potential to raise serious concerns.
For example, in the typical trademark case, a use may be
deemed infringing because it is “likely” to cause consumers to be
“confused” about the source or affiliation of a product or service
offered by the accused infringer. 71 The application of such a
standard can be explained in First Amendment terms because of
the lower level of protection that is afforded to commercial
speech. 72 But the First Amendment does not authorize regulating
noncommercial speech simply because it is misleading. 73 For
example, a political flyer or a newspaper article about a public
figure could not be enjoined, or made the basis for an award of
damages, simply because some readers would “likely” find it
“confusing.” The concept of regulating speech that has the
potential to be merely misleading, even though it is not strictly
speaking false, has developed over the thirty years since the
68

Lanham Act § 43(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (2000).
Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418 (1971) (injunction); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 364 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (damages).
70
See id. at 269.
71
See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2002).
72
Id. at 905 (“[C]onsumer protection rationale [for trademark relief]—averting what is
essentially a fraud on the consuming public—is wholly consistent with the theory of the
First Amendment, which does not protect commercial fraud.”).
73
N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 271.
69
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Supreme Court first extended First Amendment protection to
commercial speech. 74 Unlike noncommercial speech, commercial
speech can be regulated even if it is “not provably false, or even
wholly false, but only deceptive or misleading.” 75
Courts
commonly contrast the broad scope that is afforded to the
regulation of misleading speech in commercial contexts with the
much narrower forms of regulation that are permitted for noncommercial speech. 76 Trademark injunctions and similar remedies
have been upheld against First Amendment attack precisely on the
ground that it is only commercial abuses that are being regulated. 77
And, when trademark owners have attempted to invoke the
Lanham Act to prohibit allegedly “confusing” uses that were
strictly non-commercial, a number of courts have been quick to
insist that the trademark laws are limited to the commercial
context. 78 The Lanham Act is commonly construed narrowly to
avoid impinging on First Amendment protections that extend to

74
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co.
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001).
75
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9 (1979).
76
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (Although “[a]
company has the full panoply of protections available to its direct comments on public
issues, . . . there is no reason for providing similar constitutional protection when such
statements are made in the context of commercial transactions.”); Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (“[T]he leeway for untruthful or misleading expression
that has been allowed in other contexts has little force in the commercial arena.”); Smith
v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 318 (1977) (“Although . . . misleading statements in a
political oration cannot be censored, . . . misleading representations in a securities
prospectus may surely be regulated.”); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,
68 (1976) (“[R]egulatory commissions may prohibit businessmen from making
statements which, though literally true, are potentially deceptive.”).
77
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992) (rules
against exploitation of personality permissible under First Amendment because of
commercial speech context); E&J Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1297
(9th Cir. 1992) (trademark injunction permissible because it limits commercial speech).
78
Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir. 2003) (In reversing a
preliminary injunction against an allegedly misleading domain name for non-commercial
shopping “fan site,” the court stated, that the “Lanham Act is constitutional because it
only regulates commercial speech, which is entitled to reduced protection under the First
Amendment.”); CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2000)
(reversing injunction and enforcing order in previous trademark case that forbade Web
site criticizing trademark owner because the Web site “served a primarily informational
purpose, not a commercial one”).
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non-commercial speech, 79 and when relief is sought under state
trademark laws or federal statutes affording special trademark-like
protection but that do not contain language limiting the statute’s
scope to commercial uses, courts have been forced to invoke the
First Amendment directly to forbid enforcement. 80
In previous years, members of Congress have been acutely
sensitive to the dangers posed by the extension of trademark law to
regulate non-commercial speech. Thus, in the course of adding a
cause of action for false advertising to the Lanham Act, 81 the
House Judiciary Committee emphasized that the change was
intended to apply only to “commercial advertising” and not to
political advertising, and hence, would not affect noncommercial
speech. 82 Similarly, in the course of adding a dilution cause of
action in 1996, Senator Hatch explained that the bill “addresses
legitimate first amendment concerns” through the noncommercial
use exception which exempts “parody, satire, editorial and other

79
Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494
(2d Cir. 1989). When applying the section 43(a)(2) cause of action against deceptive
advertising, courts have struggled to decide whether a particular use was noncommercial, and hence refutable only under standards permissible under New York Times
v. Sullivan, or whether it was commercial speech and hence more easily regulated under
commercial speech standards. See Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 173 F.3d 1109,
1119–21 (8th Cir. 1999). See also Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 111–14 (6th
Cir. 1995). See also U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898
F.2d 914, 927–39 (3d Cir. 1990).
80
See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32–33 (1st Cir. 1987)
(Maine anti-dilution law could not constitutionally be applied to enjoin prurient parody of
L.L. Bean catalogue). See also Lighthawk v. Robertson, 812 F. Supp. 1095, 1097–03
(W.D. Wash. 1993) (special federal protection for Forest Service use of Smokey the Bear
could not constitutionally bar environmental group’s poster attacking a Forest Service
proposal by showing Smokey with a chain saw). See also Stop the Olympic Prison v.
U.S. Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112, 1124–25 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (narrowly
construing a special federal statute providing trademark-like protection to words
associated with Olympics to avoid application to bar use of Olympic name by group
attacking construction plans to convert Olympic village into a prison).
81
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, adding what is now § 43(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §
1051 (2000). Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat 3935 (1988).
82
135 CONG. REC. H1207, 1217 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1989), 1989 WL 191679 (“[T]he
proposed change in section 43(a) should not be read in any way to limit political speech,
consumer or editorial comment, parodies, satires, or other constitutionally protected
material . . . The section is narrowly drafted to encompass only clearly false and
misleading commercial speech.”).
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forms of expression that are not [] part of a commercial
transaction.” 83
The second reason for concern about the elimination of the
non-commercial use defense was a much more practical one,
relating to the realities of litigation. In litigation over the use of
trademarks in either domain names or meta tags for web sites
about trademark owners, consumer critics of trademark holders
have had a fair amount of success getting out of litigation, quickly
and cheaply, by raising the non-commercial use defense. 84 Even
in cases where the critics’ victory was largely on other grounds, the
non-commercial use arguments were obviously on the court’s mind
in rejecting the trademark claims. 85 Fair use, by contrast, tends to
require application of a multi-factor test that is heavily dependent
on context. 86 The aspect of fair use that would most likely apply
to a person who used a trademark to refer to the owner of the
trademark or its goods is nominative use, and although courts in
several circuits have indicated their acceptance of the proposition
that this form of fair use exists, 87 they are not in agreement on
exactly how such fair use can be established. 88 At this writing, the
most recent statement of the standards for establishing nominative
fair use was a Third Circuit decision that ran on for some ten pages
to explain how nominative use cases should be analyzed under its
three pronged test (four pages on the nominative use defense
alone); the concurring opinion contains a lengthy critique of that
83

141 CONG. REC. S19306-10 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995), 1995 WL 770583.
E.g., Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 677–78 (9th Cir. 2005);
Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774–76 (6th Cir. 2003); TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell,
368 F.3d 433, 438 (5th Cir. 2004); Crown Pontiac, Inc. v. Ballock, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1256,
1259 (N.D. Ala. 2003); ServiceMaster Co. v. Virga, Civil Action No. 99-2866-TUV
(W.D. Tenn.) (case dismissed voluntarily after motion to dismiss filed). See also Ficker
v. Tuohy, 305 F. Supp. 2d 569, 572 (D. Md. 2004).
85
E.g., Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 314, 317–18 (4th Cir. 2005). The court
declined to reach the issue of whether commercial use is generally a condition for
trademark liability, but held instead that initial interest confusion applies only in
commercial context. Id. at 317.
86
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 224 (3d Cir. 2005).
87
E.g., id. at 217; Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 546 (5th Cir.
1998); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir.
1992). None of the circuits have disapproved of the defense.
88
Compare Century 21, 425 F.3d at 224 with Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d
796, 801–04 (9th Cir. 2002).
84
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analysis. 89 A large company with a substantial litigation budget
can handle this uncertainty and can afford the litigation that is
required to apply the defense, even though making the defense rest
on a complicated fair use analysis may make dismissal harder to
obtain at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage.
Citizen and consumer critics are at least as likely to be worn down
by the expense of litigation—or deterred from defending
themselves by the prospect of incurring such costs—as they are by
actual losses in court—and trademark cases are notoriously
expensive. 90
The non-commercial use defense was originally part of the bill
as introduced in the House but was deleted from the bill, as part of
a change that was responsive to criticism from the ACLU that the
“non-commercial use” exception did not provide enough
protection to commercial speech. 91 The non-commercial use
defense was replaced by an express fair use provision that
protected “[f]air use of a famous mark by another person, other
than as a designation of source for that person’s goods or services,
including for purposes of identifying and parodying, criticizing, or
commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services
of the famous mark owner.” 92 Although this exception was plainly
written with free speech considerations in mind, and standing alone
was plainly a desirable addition to the bill, as a substitute for the
non-commercial use exception it was actually worse from the
perspective of any ordinary citizen who must face the realities of
litigation 93 for two main reasons.
First, the limitation of the specific fair use protection to uses
that discuss the trademark owner itself leaves out a wide range of
89

Century 21, 425 F.3d at 224–28, 247–50.
Posting of Declan McCullagh to http://www.politechbot.com/2005/08/25/trademarkbill-threatens/ (Aug 25, 2005 18:19:31) (last visited Aug. 4, 2006) (posting e-mail from
Paul Alan Levy to Declan McCullagh (Aug 25, 2005 18:19:31)).
91
ACLU Testimony, supra note 32, at 7–9.
92
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).
93
One oddity of the new language is that it seems to make unnecessary the pre-existing
exception for “[f]air use of a famous mark by another person in comparative commercial
advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner of the
famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000). Any use of a famous mark in comparative
advertising would necessarily be a use for purpose of “commenting” or “criticizing.”
90
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trademark uses that ought to be permissible. 94 Trademarks, after
all, and famous trademarks in particular, provide important cultural
reference points, which speakers or artists commonly use to make
their points more clearly. 95 To take one example that was cited in
the discussions of H.R. 683: Walter Mondale’s put-down of Gary
Hart during the 1984 primaries, using the Wendy’s slogan
“Where’s the Beef,” would not be within the protection of
proposed section 43(c)(3)(B). 96 It is quite likely that the slogan
would be a famous trademark even under the new definition of
famousness; a strong case could be made for likelihood of blurring;
and although the use was non-commercial, that alone would not be
a protection from the dilution cause of action. The phrase was
used to comment, to be sure, but not to comment on Wendy’s;
Mondale just borrowed the phrase to comment on Hart. There are,
indeed, a number of cases in which trademark claims have been
brought against political figures who invoked trademarks in
comparable ways. 97
Such uses were of particular concern to the photographers,
artists and writers who sought changes in the bill after they
recognized how directly the proposed changes could affect them.
In a leading opinion by Judge Alex Kozinski construing the “noncommercial use” exception, the Ninth Circuit had held that the
exception extends to artistic expression even though the artistic
work containing the expression is sold. 98 Moreover, in an offmike discussion among the panelists at the symposium, it was

94

See Trademark Dilution Act Hearing, supra note 67.
E.g., Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 972–76
(1993).
96
See id.
97
In Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 686 (N.D. Ohio 2002), a
candidate for governor of Ohio placed his opponent’s head on the body of a duck which
said “Taft-quack,” not intending to say anything about AFLAC but was using their
famous duck quack to make fun of Ohio governor Bob Taft. In MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v.
Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 2004),
MasterCard sued Ralph Nader for his television commercial listing the cost of various
political fundraising affairs, and then describing “finding out the truth” as being
“priceless”; the Nader campaign did not invoke the famous “Priceless” campaign theme
to comment on MasterCard but to comment on other politicians. The non-commercial
use exception was the key to defeating dilution claims in both of these cases.
98
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F3d 894, 905–07 (9th Cir. 2002).
95
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apparent that the sponsoring organizations had Judge Kozinski’s
opinion squarely within their sights as a reason to eliminate the
“non-commercial use” exception. But artists find it hard to portray
a common scene without including references to famous
trademarks, whether it be a Coke bottle sitting on a table or the
Empire State Building in the background. The picture is not
commenting on the mark so much as using the mark to establish
the context. Yet without the non-commercial use defense,
photographers saw themselves as exposed to the prospect of easy
threats of litigation.
A rather timely threat of litigation against an artist for his use
of a famous trademark gained particular notoriety in the weeks
before the Senate Judiciary Committee considered the TDRA.
Donald Stewart, a graphic artist whose drawings tended to reflect
visual puns of their subject, was threatened for selling a drawing in
the shape of a classic Volkswagen “bug,” which portrayed the car
being made out of insect parts. 99 Lawyers for Volkswagen of
America threatened Stewart with suit for diluting and infringing
their trademark, 100 and several supporters of the restoration of the
“non-commercial use” language cited this incident as showing the
need to keep that language, because even though Stewart sold his
artwork, this was precisely the sort of “non-commercial speech”
that the exception has been construed as protecting. 101
To be sure, in the bill that passed the House, exception (B)
protected fair use “including” for purposes of commentary;
perhaps it could have been argued that the language allowed other
kinds of fair use arguments to be made, including a more general
nominative fair use argument under standards like those set forth in

99
The drawing can be seen at http://www.dsart.com/Gallery/vw_bug.htm (last visited
July 23, 2006).
100
Patrick Hickerson, Bug-like Artwork is Bugging Carmaker: Volkswagen Says
Drawing Infringes on Trademark, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Jan. 26, 2006, at 1.
101
E.g., Letter on H.R. 683 from Joan Claybrook, Public Citizen, et al. to the
S. Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 3, 2006), at 6 (available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
Judiciary%20Committee%20letter%20on%20H.R.%20683.pdf (last visited July 23,
2006); Letter from Donald Stewart to Senator Jeff Sessions (Jan. 23, 2006) (available
at
http://www.stockphotographer.info/images/stories/Legislation/don%20stewart%20
letter.pdf) (last visited July 23, 2006).
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Century 21 102 or Playboy v. Welles. 103 This argument was
bolstered by the Hatch-Leahy substitute that was prepared in
anticipation of mark-up in the Senate Judiciary Committee, which
prefaced the “comparative” and “commentary” fair use language
with the words, “any fair use, including nominative and descriptive
fair use, . . . including in connection with . . .” Yet another version
that was circulated was even more helpful, stating that the
protected fair use was “including, but not limited to, use in
connection with” comparative and commentary uses. Each of
these versions was helpful in at least making clear that there could
or would be an opportunity to argue other forms of fair use.
But what this language could not do was provide the straightforward, easily invoked defense that “non-commercial use”
provided. Letters to the Judiciary Committee from a current and
former executive director of the American Society of Media
Photographers 104 each referred to a case in which a photographer
had been sued over a poster showing the Rock and Roll Hall of
Fame. 105 They pointed out that although the defendant had won the
case, he had lost the war, because the costs of litigation had put
him out of business. 106 The benefit of the non-commercial use
exception is that it provides an inexpensive way out of such
litigation. Indeed, a compilation of examples of incidental uses of
trademarks to illustrate points under discussion, but without any
intention of commenting on the trademark holder for the purpose
of criticism or parody, was circulated to Senate Judiciary
Committee members on the eve of markup, and was reportedly
extremely effective in showing just what was at stake.107
Therefore, we were relieved when, on the eve of the Senate
102

Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005).
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002).
104
Letter from Victor Perlman to Senator Orrin Hatch, (Feb. 7, 2006) (available at
http://www.asmp.org/news/spec2006/HR683letter.php) (last visited July 23, 2006); Letter
from Richard Weisgrau to Senator Orrin Hatch (Feb. 3, 2006) (available at
http://www.stockphotographer.info/images/stories/Richard_Weisgrau/letter_to_senator_
hatch.pdf) (last visited July 23, 2006).
105
Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum. v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749 (6th Cir.
1998).
106
See Perlman, supra note 104; Weisgrau, supra note 104.
107
A copy of the compilation is posted at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
TMDilutionExamples.pdf (last visited July 23, 2006).
103
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Judiciary Committee’s markup, the Senators agreed to restore the
non-commercial use exception to section 43(c)(3).
One major problem remains in the bill at this writing, however.
Under current law, the three exceptions in section 43(c)(4) of the
Lanham Act, under the language of the statute, apply to “this
section.” Because standard drafting parlance refers to sections of
the United States Code as “sections,” 108 while identifying the first
level of subdivisions of sections as “subsections,” and because
other provisions in section 43 expressly refer to “section” when
Congress meant to refer to section 43 and to “subsection” when
Congress meant to refer to subsection (a) or (c), 109 the language
“this section” is properly construed to mean that claims under
subsection (a) of section 43 are also subject to these provisos. 110
But under the bill, the exceptions would apply instead to “dilution
by blurring and dilution by tarnishment under this subsection.” 111
Thus, the protections for fair use, non-commercial use, and news
reporting would no longer extend to suits for infringement under

108

See House Legislative Counsel’s Manual on Drafting Style, HLC No. 104-1, p. 24
(1995) and Senate Office of the Legislative Counsel, Legislative Drafting Manual 10
(1997) (cited in Koons Buick v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 60–61 (2004)).
109
For example, § 43(b) bars the importation of goods labeled “in contravention of the
provisions of this section.” Subsection (b) does not specify anything that could be
contravened. The provision obviously uses the term “section” to refer both to § 43(a) and
§ 43(c). Other paragraphs of subsection (c) refer specifically to actions brought “under
this subsection.” Lanham Act §§ 43(c)(1) (“to obtain such other relief as is provided in
this subsection”); Lanham Act §§ 43(c)(2) (“In an action brought under this subsection”).
Similarly, in describing the in rem cause of action against domain names whose owners
cannot be sued in the United States, the Anti-Cybersquatting Protection Act (“ACPA”)
allows claims to be brought over marks that are “registered . . ., or protected under
subsection (a) and (c) of this section.” § 43(d)(2)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
110
The issue was been expressly decided in Planned Parenthood v. Bucci. 1997 WL
133313 (SDNY) at *7, aff’d mem., 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998), cited with approval,
OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 196–97 (W.D.N.Y. 2000), and
PGC Property v. Wainscott/Sagaponack Property Owners, 250 F. Supp. 2d 136, 141
(E.D.N.Y. 2003). Ficker v. Tuohy quotes the language of § 43(c)(4)(B) in holding that
non-commercial use is not actionable under section 43, which is not surprising since the
“this section” argument was made expressly in Tuohy’s brief. 305 F. Supp. 2d 569, 572
(D. Md. 2004). TMI v. Maxwell observed that the non-commercial use exception extends
to section 43(a) without expressly addressing the “this section” language that was
addressed in the briefs. 368 F.3d 433, 436–38 and n.2 (5th Cir. 2004).
111
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, H. Rep. 109-23, 109th Cong., 1st Sess.
(2005).
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section 43(a), which is the principal means of enforcing
unregistered trademarks. 112
This change is particularly troubling with respect to the “fair
use” exception, because a close reading of section 33(b), which
creates the defense of fair use, shows that it appears to be limited
to defenses against claimed infringement of registered trademarks
(which can be pursued under section 32 of the Act). 113 If the
applicability of the fair use exclusion in section 43(c) is no longer
to apply to all of “this section,” then there will be no fair use
provisions which, under the literal words of the statute, will apply
to unfair competition or infringement claims under section 43(a).
To be sure, in cases decided after section 43(c)(4) was enacted,
lower federal courts have ignored the literal fair use language of
the Act in several ways, both by discussing the fair use defense in
cases brought solely under section 43 of the Act without
considering whether that defense stemmed from section 33(b)(4) or
section 43(c)(4), 114 and by applying the fair use defense in section
43(a) cases brought before the enactment of section 43(c)(4). 115
On the other hand, the Supreme Court’s recent ventures into
trademark law used analyses that were closely tailored to careful
reading of the statutory language. 116 Thus, although the argument
could certainly be made that the courts have always understood fair
use to provide a defense to section 43(a) claims regardless of the
language of section 33(b), enacting a statute that deliberately
112

Id.
“Such conclusive evidence of the right to use the registered mark shall be subject to
proof of infringement as defined in section 32, and shall be subject to the following
defenses or defects: . . . (4) That the use of the name, term or device charged to be an
infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, . . . of a term or device which is
descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of
such party, or their geographic origin . . .”
114
E.g., Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1009 (9th Cir. 2001).
115
E.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 412–13 (9th Cir. 1996);
A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, 796 F.2d 903, 908 (7th Cir. 1986). Indeed, the
doctrine of nominative fair use has arisen despite the fact that the concept cannot be
found either in the express fair use language of section 33(b)(4),which allows fair use in
of a trademarked word mark in its descriptive sense, or the fair use language of section
43(c)(4)(A), which pertains only to “comparative commercial advertising.”
116
E.g., KP Permanent Make-Up v. Lasting Impressions I, 543 U.S. 111, 117–21
(2004); Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31–38 (2003);
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 432–34 (2003).
113
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removes the “this section” language making fair use a proper
defense to section 43(a) claims just lays the ground for a statutory
construction argument that can be avoided, and thus risks putting
fair users at risk in a way that Congress ought to avoid.
The repeal of the “this section” language similarly puts at risk
the argument that the trademark laws do not apply to noncommercial uses. 117 There are, to be sure, other snippets of
statutory language on which defendants have relied over the years,
and which courts have invoked, to confine the application of the
trademark laws to commercial uses. Section 43(a) provides for
civil liability on the part of a person “who, on or in connection
with goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in
commerce any [mark].” Similar language appears in section 32,
providing for liability of a person who “use[s] in commerce any
[mark] in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution or
advertising of any goods or services.” 118 The “in connection with
goods or services” language has been understood in several cases
as limiting the scope of the infringement cause of action to
commercial uses, 119 and other courts have seized on the “use in
commerce” language, coupled with the statutory definition of “use
in commerce” as meaning “bona fide use of the mark in the
ordinary course of trade,” to decide that even though the statute
defines “commerce” as extending to the full reach of the
Commerce Clause, 120 the statutory phrase “use in commerce”
limits the scope of the infringement cause of action. 121 Moreover,
117

Trademark Dilution Revision Act, H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2006).
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).
119
Bosley Med. Inst. Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2005); Taubman Co. v.
WebFeats, 319 F.3d 770, 775 (6th Cir. 2003).
120
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283 (1952).
121
Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am. v. Surgical Techs. Inc., 285 F.3d 848, 855 (9th Cir.
2002); Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am. v. Fiber Tech Med., 4 Fed. Appx. 128, 131 (4th Cir.
2001); Int’l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Winship Green
Nursing Center, 103 F.3d 196, 209–10 (1st Cir. 1996) (concurring opinion); WHS Entm’t
Ventures v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, 997 F. Supp. 946, 949 (M.D. Tenn. 1998).
Several recent cases have also decided rejected trademark claims based on pop-up
advertising on the ground that the defendant did not make the requisite “use in
commerce.” E.g., 1-800 Contacts. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 411–12 (2d Cir.
2005). Although the Second Circuit discussed several cases as construing the phrase “use
in commerce,” in the end it treated “use” as a requirement distinct from “in commerce.”
Id.
118
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wholly apart from the precise language of the statute, the very way
in which the courts normally discuss the likelihood of confusion in
deciding infringement claims, 122 not to speak of the
characterization that many courts give to the “likelihood of
confusion factors,” assumes that trademark law is addressed solely
to commercial competitors. 123
However, neither of these arguments is without counterweight,
in the language of the statute with respect to “in connection
with,” 124 and in a number of cases stating that “use in commerce”
itself extends to the limits of the Commerce Clause. 125 Even more
122

E.g., Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994) (to raise an inference
of a likelihood of confusion, [plaintiff] must show that [defendant] intended to profit by
confusing consumers”); Lang v. Retirement Living Pub. Co., 949 F.2d 576, 582–83 (2d
Cir. 1991) (“Lanham Act seeks to prevent consumer confusion that allows a seller to pass
of his goods as the goods of another. . . . [T]he relevant confusion is that which affects
the purchasing and selling of the goods or services in question. . . . Trademark
infringement protects against mistaken purchasing decisions and not against confusion
generally.”); see also Prestonettes v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) (Holmes, J.) (in preLanham Act case, “trade-mark only gives the right to prohibit the use of [a word] so far
as to protect the owner’s good will against the sale of another’s product as his.”).
Similarly, courts have rejected attempts by consumers to sue companies under § 43(a) on
the ground that “[t]he act’s purpose, as defined in Section 45, is exclusively to protect the
interests of a purely commercial class against unscrupulous commercial conduct.” Made
in the USA Found. v. Phillips, 365 F.3d 278, 280 (4th Cir. 2004); Colligan v. Activities
Club of N.Y., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1971).
123
See Newton, 22 F.3d 1455; Lang, 949 F.2d 576. See also Sunlight Saunas, Inc. v.
Sundance Sauna, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1056–57 and n.26 (D. Kan. 2006)
(trademark laws are limited to regulation of commercial speech as defined by First
Amendment doctrine).
124
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000). Section 43(a) does not contain the words “sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising” that appear in section 32(1). Section
43(a)(1)(A) does allow a claim when the defendant is likely to cause confusion about the
origin “of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities.” It could be argued that
because the statute uses commercial activities in a series with “goods [or] services,” it is
implicit that goods and services need not be not commercial. Or, it could be argued that
the word “other” is implicit, as in “goods, services or [other] commercial services.”
Similarly, because section 43(a)(1)(B) expressly limits the cause of action for false
advertising to “commercial advertising or promotion,” perhaps it is implicit that the
goods and services language in the introductory language of section 43(a) is not limited
to commercial goods and services.
125
Bosley Medical Inst. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2005); Planetary
Motion, Inc. v. Techplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2001); United We
Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92–93 (2d Cir.1997).
There is no question that the reason why the statutory definition was enacted was to
accompany the addition of “use in commerce” language to the process for registering
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worrisome is the inference about Congressional intent that might
be supported by what trademark owners will certainly argue was a
deliberate decision to withdraw the application of the
noncommercial use exception from applicability to the entirety of
“this section.” Moreover, there is not a perfect fit between the
doctrine of “non-commercial speech” in the First Amendment
sense and the general rule that even non-profit institutions whose
main activities consist of non-commercial speech—for example,
political parties, churches, and public interest organizations—are
allowed both to register trademarks and to enforce them against
rival institutions that adopt confusing names to siphon off
contributions and memberships. 126
And yet, despite the fact that the language has so clearly been
changed in a way that would appear to be deliberate, there is some
reason to wonder whether, until we called the issue to public
attention, any members of Congress had focused on the
implications of the elimination of the “this section” language.
None of the witnesses who testified before the IP subcommittee of
the House Judiciary Committee in both 2004 and 2005 mentioned
the elimination of the “this section” language, and neither did the
House Report on the bill. 127 The AIPLA submitted a written
statement that came close to being deceptive in implying that the
exclusions were being expanded along with the expansion of
dilution to cover tarnishment expressly. 128
trademarks. But nothing in the language of the statute even hints that the definition is
limited to that context, and § 45 expressly comprehends “the construction of this
chapter,” i.e., Chapter 22 of Title 15. Other definitional provisions in the Lanham Act are
limited to a particular “subchapter,” see Lanham Act § 60, 15 U.S.C. § 1141 (2000), or
even a single subsection or paragraph, e.g., Lanham Act §§ 34(d)(1)(B), 32(2)(E) (2000).
126
E.g., United We Stand, 128 F.3d 86; NAACP v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund,
753 F.2d 131 (DC Cir.1985); Gideons Int’l v. Gideon 300 Ministries, 94 F. Supp. 2d 566
(E.D. Pa. 1999) (Although it is a non-profit, “by incorporating, raising money, and
distributing goods and services to the consuming public, Gideon 300 engages in
commercial activity.”).
127
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, H. Rep. 109-23, 109th Cong., 1st Sess.
(2005).
128
“AIPLA supports proposed section 1125(c)(3) which would extend the existing
defenses for dilution to blurring and tarnishment causes of action. Currently, the FTDA
provides that the following “shall not be actionable” under this statute: [listing the three].
These defenses should be extended to the specifically defined causes of action for
blurring and tarnishment.” HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON CTS., THE INTERNET AND
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We have heard that some trademark-owner interests are
worried about the impact that the newly rewritten fair use language
might have on section 43(a) claims, but since that language was
not in the original draft of the bill, that could not be an explanation
for the change. Nor have we been able to get any explanation of
any actual problems that the new fair use language would cause
when applied to section 43(a) claims. Indeed, if this were the real
problem, there is no reason to eliminate the non-commercial use
and news reporting defenses to section 43(a) claims. Moreover,
because the “this section” language had been deleted when the bill
was first introduced in the House, before there had been any
change in the fair use language, that could not have been the real
reason for the change.
Instead of grappling with these concerns, some of the bill’s
proponents claim that this change was not deliberate. 129 But that is
hardly an argument for keeping the new language. If it wasn’t
deliberate, there would seem to be no reason not to restore the “this
section” language, at least as it applies to the “non-commercial”
and news reporting exceptions.
We have heard three other arguments about why the “this
section” language should not be retained in the exclusions
provision. The first is that non-commercial use is protected by the
First Amendment, so section 43(a) to non-commercial speech and
news reporting would be unconstitutional anyway. To be sure, the
First Amendment issues are most pronounced in the dilution
context, where speech is being suppressed despite the complete
absence even of any concern about confusion. But in the context
of noncommercial speech, it is troubling to speak of imposing legal
sanctions for speech which is only “likely” to be “confusing,” and
not actually false and not intentionally false. Even more troubling
is the possible issuance of a preliminary injunction against noncommercial speech—in First Amendment terms, a prior restraint—
INTELL. PROP. OF THE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, H.R., TO AMEND THE FEDERAL
TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print Apr. 22, 2004), at 59
(emphasis added). Note that the exclusions in existing law were misdescribed as
applying only to dilution; the language “this section” was not quoted but rather
characterized as applying to “this statute”; and the word “extend” was used twice.
129
See generally Trademark Panel, supra note 50 (Barton Beebe, panelist).
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based on no more than a rough assessment that success on the
merits of “likely confusion” is more probable than not.
Moreover, Congress should not be in the business of passing
unconstitutional laws and leaving it to the courts to sort out the
problems. When Congress enacted section 43(c) back in 1996, it
did the responsible thing by carving out the constitutional
problems, and it did the same thing when it added section 43(a)(2)
in the late 1980’s, taking note of the constitutional issues and
adding language to address the issue. Second, litigators who
represent consumers sued for non-commercial speech rightly
worry about the chilling effect of a change in the law that strips
consumers of a non-commercial speech defense claim that has
been repeatedly recognized in the case law.130 The noncommercial
speech defense is especially important because, if a case has to be
litigated on likelihood of confusion, the expense and complexity of
the litigation become much greater. That difference both makes it
harder to find a pro bono lawyer, and increases the burden of the
litigation if the consumer has to pay a lawyer. Moreover, when
consumers receive demand letters quoting the law, there will be no
evident exception for non-commercial speech, and they are more
likely to simply surrender their rights. And, if they try to
persevere, it is going to be much harder for them to afford to
defend themselves.
Additionally, in the course of any ensuing litigation, trademark
owners would surely point to Congress’ deliberate elimination of
the non-commercial use defense, and urge the Court not to hold the
statute unconstitutional in part. 131
From the standpoint of
defending those who use trademarks to explain how and why they
are making criticisms, it is preferable to be able to point to
language in a statute that avoids the need to confront a
constitutional issue than to have to argue that a federal statute
cannot constitutionally be applied to the particular case.
Accordingly, this is a change that will have a very deleterious
impact on the practicalities of litigation from the consumer
standpoint.
130
131

See supra notes 26–27 and 99–106 and accompanying text.
See supra note 128.
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In a letter circulated to ranking members of the House
Judiciary Committee in April 2006, the AIPLA argued that, if the
“this section” language were left in place, it would create an
unintended loophole in § 43(d), the ACPA. But that is far from the
case. After all, as the AIPLA conceded, the ACPA was
“enacted . . . to deal with the rampant problem of profiteers
registering the trademarks of companies as domain names and
trying to extract money from trademark owners wishing to own the
domain names that incorporate their trademarks.” 132 To that end,
the statute applies when the defendant acts with “a bad faith intent
to profit” from the mark. 133 Because Congress found that many
cybersquatters would register many names and just sit on them
without using them and without making an explicit demand for
payment, it enumerated a set of factors to help courts decide the
purpose for picking the domain name 134 and employed, as one
factor for deciding whether bad faith intent to profit exists, whether
the defendant made a “bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the
mark on a web site accessible under the domain name.” 135
AIPLA posited that allowing noncommercial or fair use to
override a bad faith intent to profit would transform that factor into
a dispositive issue, thus undermining the multifactor scheme of the
ACPA. But its argument does not hold water, because AIPLA
loses sight of what is and is not a noncommercial or fair use of a
domain name. If the various factors point to the conclusion that
the defendant registered or used a domain name for reasons of
extortion, then that defendant could not possibly be using the name
either fairly or noncommercially. After all, such a person is trying
to make money, so his use can scarcely be said to be
noncommercial. The Ninth Circuit had no difficulty coming to
such a conclusion in a pre-ACPA case, because, as the court

132

AIPLA Letter, at 1. A copy is in the files of the Fordham Intellectual Property,
Media & Entertainment Law Journal. See Virtual Works v. Volkswagen of Am., 238
F.3d 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2001) (“the Internet version of a land grab . . . in order to force
the rightful owners of the marks to pay for the right to engage in electronic commerce
under their own brand name”).
133
Section 43(d)(1)(A)(i).
134
Section 43(c)(1)(B)(i)(I)–(IX).
135
Section 43(c)(1)(B)(i)(IV).
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reasoned, a cybersquatter’s business is selling domain names. 136
Moreover, the person has acted in bad faith, so it is hard to argue
that there is fair use. Thus, there will be no cases in which a
person acted with a bad faith intent to profit but can escape liability
under the exclusions.
The final argument made for not restoring the “this section”
language is that adoption of the that language was accidental in
1996, because the drafters of the original 1996 provisions were
only thinking about providing exceptions to the dilution
provisions, and it had not occurred to them that “this section,”
when incorporated into the United States Code, would refer to
section 43 and not to the provision that they were inserting into the
Lanham Act. 137 According to this argument, inclusion of the
words “this section” was a drafting error, and the new language is
desirable because it better implements the original intention of the
drafters. 138 Because the other arguments being put forward for
refusing to restore the original language of the statute are so
tenuous, this is probably the best explanation for why the change
has been made, although it is certainly at odds with the argument
advanced by the same sponsors that the change with not
deliberate. 139 And, on the assumption that the change is intended
to fix a drafting error, it should not be taken as an expression of
desire to overrule any of the court decisions finding limitations to
commercial use in other provisions of the statute.
But although the “this section” language was probably an
accident in 1996, it was a happy accident, because non-commercial
use gives consumers an easier way out of trademark litigation than
the application of multi-factor tests for “likely confusion” or “fair
use” would provide. It is the proponents of change who ought to
have the burden of explaining why the old language is causing
problems, and the case has simply not been made that “this
section” causes problems under the current statute.

136
137
138
139

Panavision Int’l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1998).
See generally Trademark Panel, supra note 50 (Barton Beebe, panelist).
Id.
See generally id.
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It must be acknowledged that the application of the
noncommercial use exception to section 43(a) claims is not the
perfect solution for consumers—it does not stretch far enough in
some respects, and it may even go too far in some respects. Nor is
it the only language in the Lanham Act on which consumers can
rely for protection when they are sued for using a trademarked
name for the non-commercial purpose of criticizing a trademark
holder. If the Lanham Act were being redrafted in its entirety, it
would nice to be able to include changes to address the problem of
applying section 32 of the Act in contexts that Congress never
attended to reach, and which also raise significant First
Amendment issues. But like the bill’s proponents, the consumer
and arts advocates and civil libertarians must also accept that this
bill is not designed to resolve all the ills of the Lanham Act, but
only to revise section 43(c) to resolve certain problems that have
arisen in its interpretation over the past nine years. Fixing the
Lanham Act in other respects can wait for a later day.

